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1 Introduction
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable
matchings when agents have substitutable preferences.
Many-to-many matching models have been useful for studying assignment
problems with the distinctive feature that agents can be divided from the
very beginning into two disjoint subsets: the set of rms and the set of
workers.
1
The nature of the assignment problem consists of matching each
agent (rms and workers) with a subset of agents from the other side of the
market. Thus, each rm will hire a subset of workers while each worker may
work for a number of dierent rms.
The problem becomes interesting because agents have preferences on the
subsets of potential partners. Stability has been considered the main property
to be satised by any sensible matching. A matching is called stable if all
agents have an acceptable subset of partners and there is no unmatched
worker-rm pair who both would prefer to add the other to their current
subset of partners. To give all blocking power to only individual agents and
worker-rm pairs seems a very weak requirement in terms of the durability
of the matching.
Unfortunately the set of stable matchings may be empty. Substitutabil-
ity is the weakest condition imposed on agents preferences under which the
existence of stable matchings is guaranteed. An agent has substitutable pref-
erences if he continues to want to partner an agent of the other side of the
market even if other agents become unavailable.
2
Surprisingly, the set of stable matchings under substitutable preferences is
very-well structured. It contains two distinctive matchings: the rm-optimal
stable matching (denoted by 
F
) and the worker-optimal stable matching
(denoted by 
W
). The matching 
F
is unanimously considered by all rms
to be the best among all stable matchings and by all workers to be the worst
among all stable matchings. Symmetrically, the matching 
W
is unanimously
considered by all workers to be the best among all stable matchings and by
all rms to be the worst among all stable matchings. They can be obtained
by the so-called deferred-acceptance algorithm (originally dened by Gale
and Shapley (1962) for the one-to-one case and later adapted by Roth (1984)
to the many-to-many case). Additionally, Blair (1988) shows that the set of
1
We will be using as a reference (and as a source of terminology) labor markets with
part-time jobs and we will generically refer to these two sets as the two sides of the market.
2
See Denition 3 for a formal statement of this property. Kelso and Crawford (1982)
were the rst to use it to show the existence of stable matchings in a many-to-one model
with money. Roth (1984) shows that if all agents have substitutable preferences the set of
many-to-many stable matchings is non-empty.
1
stable matchings has a lattice structure.
3
In particular, Roth (1984) and Blair
(1988) show that this unanimity and opposition of interests of the two sides
of the market is even stronger in the sense that all rms, if they had to choose
the best subset from the set of workers made up of the union of the rm-
optimal stable matching and any other stable matching, would choose the
rm-optimal stable matching. Also, all rms, if they had to choose the best
subset from the set of workers made up of the union of the worker-optimal
stable matching and any other stable matching, would choose the stable
matching. And symmetrically, the two properties also hold interchanging
the roles of rms and workers.
4
While there are many algorithms designed to compute the full set of one-
to-one stable matchings as well as the two-optimal stable matchings (for the
many-to-many model) we are not aware of any algorithm which can compute
the full set of matchings for this more general many-to-many case.
5
This
paper provides such an algorithm.
Roughly, our algorithm works by applying successively the following pro-
cedure. First, and given as input an original prole of substitutable pref-
erences, it computes by the deferred-acceptance algorithm the two optimal
stable matchings 
F
and 
W
. Second, it identies all rm-worker pairs (f; w)
where rm f hires the worker w in 
F
but not in 
W
. Successively, for each
of these pairs, it modies the preference of rm f by declaring all subsets of
workers containing worker w unacceptable but leaving the orderings among
all subsets not containing w unchanged. This is called an (f; w)-truncation
of the original preference. By the deferred-acceptance algorithm it computes
(for each pair) the rm-optimal stable matching corresponding to the prefer-
ence prole where all agents have the original preferences except that rm f
has the (f; w)-truncated preference. Third, although this new rm-optimal
stable matching may not be stable relative to the original preference prole
it is stable provided that all workers, if they had to choose the best subset
from the set of rms made up of the union of the two rm-optimal stable
matchings (the original and the new one) they would choose the new one.
If it passes this test (and hence, if it is stable relative to the original prole
of preferences) we keep it and proceed again from the very beginning using
this modied prole as an input.
6
The algorithm stops when there is no
3
Roth (1985), Sotomayor (1999), Alkan (1999), and Mart

inez, Masso, Neme, and
Oviedo (1999) also study the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings in dier-
ent models.
4
See Remark 1 in Section 2 for a formal statement of these four properties.
5
See Guseld and Irving (1989) for an algorithmic approach to the one-to-one and
roommate models.
6
In the formal denition of the algorithm the reader will nd an additional (but dis-
2
rm-worker pair with the above property.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the preliminary
notation, denitions, and results. Section 3 contains the denition of the
algorithm, the Theorem stating that the outcome of the algorithm is equal
to the set of stable matchings, and an example illustrating how the algorithm
works. In Section 4 we prove the Theorem. Finally, an Appendix at the
end of the paper illustrates by means of an example the deferred-acceptance
algorithm of Gale and Shapley adapted to the many-to-many case.
2 Preliminaries
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n rms F = ff
1
; :::; f
n
g
and the set of m workers W = fw
1
; :::; w
m
g. Generic elements of both sets
will be denoted, respectively, by f , f
i
, f
i
k
,

f , and
~
f , and by w, w
j
, w
j
k
, w,
and ~w. A generic agent will be denoted by a and we will refer to a set of
partners of a as a subset of agents of the set not containing a. Each agent a
2 F [W has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P (a) over
the set of all subsets of partners (over 2
F
if a is a worker and over 2
W
if a
is a rm). Preference proles are (n+m)-tuples of preference relations and
they are represented by P = (P (f
1
) ; :::; P (f
n
) ;P (w
1
) ; :::; P (w
m
)). Given
a preference relation of an agent P (a) the subsets of partners preferred to
the empty set by a are called acceptable; therefore, we are allowing for the
possibility that rm f may prefer not hiring any worker rather than hiring
unacceptable subsets of workers and that worker w may prefer to remain
unemployed rather than working for an unacceptable subset of rms.
To express preference relations in a concise manner, and since only ac-
ceptable partners will matter, we will represent preference relations as lists
of acceptable partners. For instance,
P (f
i
) = w
1
w
3
; w
2
; w
1
; w
3
P (w
j
) = f
1
f
3
; f
1
; f
3
indicate that fw
1
; w
3
gP (f
i
) fw
2
gP (f
i
) fw
1
gP (f
i
) fw
3
gP (f
i
) ; and
ff
1
; f
3
gP (w
j
) ff
1
gP (w
j
) ff
3
gP (w
j
) ;.
The assignment problem consists of matching workers with rms keeping
the bilateral nature of their relationship and allowing for the possibility that
both, rms and workers, may remain unmatched. Formally,
Denition 1. A matching  is a mapping from the set F [W into the set
of all subsets of F [W such that for all w 2 W and f 2 F :
pensable) step only used to speed up the algorithm.
3
1.  (w)  F or else  (w) = ;:
2.  (f)  W or else  (f) = ;.
3. f 2  (w) if and only if w 2  (f) :
Condition 1 says that a worker can be either matched to a subset of rms
or remain unmatched. Condition 2 says that a rm can either hire a subset
of workers or be unmatched. Finally, condition 3 states the bilateral nature
of a matching in the sense that rm f hires worker w if and only if worker
w works form rm f . We say that w and f are single in a matching  if
 (w) = ; and  (f) = ;. Otherwise, they are matched. A matching  is
said to be one-to-one if rms can hire at most one worker and workers can
work for at most one rm. The model in which all matchings are one-to-
one is also known in the literature as the marriage model. A matching  is
said to be many-to-one if workers can work for at most one rm but rms
may hire many workers. The model in which all matchings are many-to-
one, and rms have responsive preferences,
7
is also known in the literature
as the college admissions model. To represent matchings concisely we will
follow the widespread notation where, for instance, given F = ff
1
; f
2
; f
3
g
and W = fw
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
g
f
1
f
2
f
3
;

1
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
1
w
3
w
4
w
2

2
; w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
represents two matchings where in matching 
1
rm f
1
is matched to workers
w
3
and w
4
, rm f
2
is matched to worker w
1
, rm f
3
is matched to workers
w
1
, w
3
, and w
4
; and worker w
2
is single and in matching 
2
rm f
1
and
worker w
4
are single, rm f
2
is matched to workers w
1
and w
2
, and rm f
3
is
matched to worker w
3
. Notice that we could equivalently represent the two
matchings as
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
;

1
f
2
f
3
; f
1
f
3
f
1
f
3
;

2
f
2
f
2
f
3
; f
1
:
Let P be a preference prole. Given a set of partners S, let Ch (S; P (a))
denote agent a's most-preferred subset of S according to a's preference or-
dering P (a). A matching  is blocked by agent a if  (a) 6= Ch ( (a) ; P (a)).
7
Namely, for any two subsets of workers that dier in only one worker a rm prefers the
subset containing the most-preferred worker. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a precise
and formal denition of responsive preferences as well as for a masterful and illuminating
analysis of these models and an exhaustive bibliography.
4
We say that a matching is individually rational if it is not blocked by any
agent. We will denote by IR (P ) the set of individually rational match-
ings. A matching  is blocked by a worker-rm pair (w; f) if w =2  (f),
w 2 Ch ( (f) [ fwg ; P (f)), and f 2 Ch ( (w) [ ffg ; P (w)).
Denition 2. A matching  is stable if it is not blocked by any individual
agent or any worker-rm pair.
Given a preference prole P , denote the set of stable matchings by S (P ).
It is easy to construct examples of preference proles with the property that
the set of stable matchings is empty. Those examples share the feature that
at least one agent regards a subset of partners as being complements. This
is the reason why the literature has focused on the restriction where partners
are regarded as substitutes.
Denition 3. An agent a's preference ordering P (a) satises substitutabil-
ity if for any set S of partners containing agents b and c (b 6= c), if b 2
Ch (S; P (a)) then b 2 Ch (Sn fcg ; P (a)).
A preference prole P is substitutable if for each agent a, the preference
ordering P (a) satises substitutability.
Roth (1984) shows that if all agents have substitutable preferences then:
(1) the set of stable matchings is non-empty, (2) rms (workers) unanimously
agree that a stable matching 
F
(
W
) is the best stable matching,
8
and (3)
the optimal stable matching for one side is the worst stable matching for the
other side (that is, for all  2 S (P ) we have that R (f)
W
for all f 2 F
and R (w)
F
for all w 2 W ).
The deferred-acceptance algorithm, originally dened by Gale and Shap-
ley (1962) for the one-to-one case, produces either 
F
or 
W
depending on
who makes the oers. At any step of the algorithm in which rms make oers,
a rm proposes itself to the choice set of the set of workers that have not al-
ready rejected it during the previous steps, while a worker accepts the choice
set of the set of current oers plus those of the rms provisionally matched
in the previous step (if any). The algorithm stops at the step at which all
oers are accepted; the (provisional) matching becomes then denite and it
8
The matchings 
F
and 
W
are called, respectively, the rms-optimal stable matching
and the workers-optimal stable matching. We are following the convention of extending
preferences from the original sets (2
W
and 2
F
) to the set of matchings. However, we now
have to consider weak orderings since the matchings  and 
0
may associate the same set
of partners to an agent. These orderings will be denoted by R (f) and R (w). For instance,
to say that all rms prefer 
F
to any stable  means that for every f 2 F we have that

F
R (f) for all stable  (that is, either 
F
(f) =  (f) or else 
F
(f)P (f) (f)).
5
is the stable matching 
F
. Symmetrically, if workers make oers, the out-
come of the algorithm is the stable matching 
W
. The Appendix at the end
of the paper illustrates by means of an example how the deferred-acceptance
algorithm works for the many-to-many case.
Our algorithm will consist of applying the deferred-acceptance algorithm
where rms make oers to preferences proles that are obtained after mod-
ifying the preference of a rm by making all subsets containing a particular
worker unacceptable.
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Formally,
Denition 4. We say that a preference P
(f;w)
(f) is an (f; w) truncation
of P (f) if:
1. There exists an acceptable subset of workers according to P (f) con-
taining worker w; that is, 9S 2 2
W
such that w 2 S and SP (f) ;.
2. The preferences P (f) and P
(f;w)
(f) coincide on all subsets that not
contain w; that is, if w =2 S
1
[ S
2
then S
1
P (f)S
2
if and only if
S
1
P
(f;w)
(f)S
2
.
3. All subsets containing w are unacceptable according to P
(f;w)
(f); that
is, if w 2 S then ;P
(f;w)
(f)S.
Given a preference prole P and an (f; w) truncation of P (f) we de-
note by P
(f;w)
the preference prole obtained by replacing P (f) in P by
P
(f;w)
(f). We denote by 
(f;w)
F
and 
(f;w)
W
the rm and worker-optimal stable
matchings corresponding to the preference prole P
(f;w)
. Moreover, given
a preference prole P and a sequence of pairs (f
i
1
; w
j
1
) ::: (f
i
k
; w
j
k
) we will
represent by P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
the preference prole obtained from P af-
ter successively truncating the corresponding preference; we will also denote
by 
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
F
and 
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
W
its corresponding optimal-stable
matchings. The following lemma states that the property of substitutability
is preserved by truncations and therefore 
(f;w)
F
and 
(f;w)
W
exist provided that
P is substitutable.
Lemma 1. If P (f) is substitutable then P
(f;w)
(f) is substitutable.
Proof. Let w;w
0
2 S be arbitrary and assume that w 2 Ch(S; P
(f;w)
(f)). If
w =2 S; then w 2 Ch(Snfw
0
g; P
(f;w)
(f)) because Ch(S; P
(f;w)
(f)) = Ch(S; P (f)),
9
Given the symmetric role of rms and workers it will become clear that the construc-
tion that follows could be equivalently done by interchanging the roles of workers and
rms.
6
Ch(Snfw
0
g; P
(f;w)
(f)) = Ch(Snfw
0
g; P (f)), and because of the substitutabil-
ity of P (f). If w 2 S; then we have that Ch(S; P
(f;w)
(f)) = Ch(Snfwg; P (f));
therefore, by assumption w 2 Ch(Snfwg; P (f)). By the substitutability
of P (f) we have that w 2 Ch([Snfwg]nfw
0
g; P (f)) but the two equalities
Ch([Snfwg]nfw
0
g; P (f)) = Ch([Snfwg]nfw
0
g; P
(f;w)
(f)) = Ch(Snfw
0
g; P
(f;w)
(f))
imply that worker w 2 Ch(Snfw
0
g; P
(f;w)
(f)):
Before nishing this section we present, as a Remark below, four proper-
ties of stable matchings.
Remark 1 Assume P is substitutable and let  2 S (P ) : Then, for all f
and w:
1. Ch (
F
(f) [  (f) ; P (f)) = 
F
(f).
2. Ch (
W
(w) [  (w) ; P (w)) = 
W
(w).
3. Ch (
W
(f) [  (f) ; P (f)) =  (f).
4. Ch (
F
(w) [  (w) ; P (w)) =  (w).
Properties 1 and 2 are due to Roth (1984) while properties 3 and 4 follow
from 1, 2, and Theorem 4.5 in Blair (1988). They can be interpreted as an
strengthening of the optimality of 
F
and 
W
. Since Property 4 will play a
crucial role in the construction of our algorithm we will some times refer to
it as the Choice Property. Example 1 below shows that, although necessary,
they are far from being a characterization of stable matchings.
Example 1 Let F = ff
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
g and W = fw
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
g be the two
sets of agents with the preference prole P , where
P (f
1
) = w
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
P (f
2
) = w
2
; w
4
; w
1
P (f
3
) = w
3
; w
1
; w
2
P (f
4
) = w
4
; w
2
; w
3
P (w
1
) = f
2
; f
3
; f
1
P (w
2
) = f
3
; f
1
; f
4
; f
2
P (w
3
) = f
4
; f
1
; f
3
P (w
4
) = f
1
; f
2
; f
4
:
The two optimal-stable matchings are
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

F
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4

W
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
3
:
7
The matching
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4
 w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2
is not stable since (w
2
; f
1
) blocks it. However, it can be veried that 
satises the four properties of Remark 1.
3 An Algorithm to compute the set of stable
matchings
3.1 The Algorithm and the Theorem
Given a preference prole P , we dene an algorithm to compute the set of
stable matchings S (P ).
Stage 1: Input P . By the deferred-acceptance algorithm obtain 
F
and

W
. Set T
0
(P ) = P and S
0
(P ) = f
F
g.
Step 1: Dene T (T
0
(P )) =

P
(f;w)
j w 2 
F
(f) n
W
(f)
	
.
Step 2: (a) If T (T
0
(P )) = ; set T
1
(P ) = ; and S
1
(P ) = S
0
(P ).
(b) If not, for each truncation P
(f;w)
2 T (T
0
(P )) obtain 
(f;w)
F
.
Step 3: Dene
T

 
T
0
(P )

=
(
P
(f;w)
2 T (T
0
(P )) j 8w
0
2 W;
Ch


(f;w)
F
(w
0
) [ 
F
(w
0
) ; P (w
0
)

= 
(f;w)
F
(w
0
)
)
:
Order the set T

(T
0
(P )) in an arbitrary way and let 
1
denote this ordering.
Step 4: Dene
b
T
 
T
0
(P )

=

P
(f;w)
2 T

(T
0
(P )) j 8P
(f
0
;w
0
)
2 T

(T
0
(P ))
such that P
(f;w)

1
P
(f
0
;w
0
)
; w
0
2 
(f;w)
F
(f
0
)

:
Set
T
1
(P ) =
b
T
 
T
0
(P )

and
S
1
(P ) = S
0
(P ) [
n

(f;w)
F
j P
(f;w)
2 T
1
(P )
o
:
End of Stage 1.
Stage k+1: Input T
k
(P ) and S
k
(P ). By the deferred-acceptance algo-
rithm where rms make oers we have obtained, for each P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
2
T
k
(P ), its corresponding 
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
F
.
8
Step 1: Dene
T
 
T
k
(P )

=

P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
j w 2 
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
F
(f) n
W
(f)

:
Step 2: (a) If T
 
T
k
(P )

= ; set T
k+1
(P ) = ; and S
k+1
(P ) = S
k
(P ).
(b) If not, for each truncation P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
2 T
 
T
k
(P )

obtain 
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
F
.
Step 3: Dene
T

 
T
k
(P )

=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
2 T
 
T
k
(P )

j 8w
0
2 W;
Ch


(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
F
(w
0
) [ 
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
F
(w
0
) ; P (w
0
)

=
= 
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
F
(w
0
)
9
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
;
:
Order the set T

 
T
k
(P )

in an arbitrary way and let 
k+1
denote this
ordering.
Step 4: Dene
b
T
 
T
k
(P )

=
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
2 T

 
T
k
(P )

j
8P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f
0
;w
0
)
2 T

 
T
k
(P )

such that
P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)

k+1
P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f
0
;w
0
)
;
w
0
2 
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
F
(f
0
)
9
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
;
:
Set
T
k+1
(P ) =
b
T
 
T
k
(P )

and
S
k+1
(P ) = S
k
(P )[


(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
F
j P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
(f;w)
2 T
k+1
(P )

:
End of Stage k + 1.
The algorithm stops at the stage K where T
K
(P ) is empty.
Theorem 1. Assume P is substitutable and let K be the stage where the
algorithm stops. Then S
K
(P ) = S (P ).
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3.2 An Example
We illustrate how the algorithm works with the following example.
Example 2 Let F = ff
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
g and W = fw
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
g be the two
sets of agents with the substitutable prole of preferences P , where
P (f
1
) = w
1
w
2
; w
1
w
3
; w
2
w
4
; w
3
w
4
; w
1
w
4
; w
2
w
3
; w
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
P (f
2
) = w
1
w
2
; w
2
w
3
; w
1
w
4
; w
3
w
4
; w
1
w
3
; w
2
w
4
; w
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
P (f
3
) = w
3
w
4
; w
2
w
3
; w
1
w
4
; w
1
w
2
; w
2
w
4
; w
1
w
3
; w
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
P (f
4
) = w
3
w
4
; w
2
w
4
; w
1
w
3
; w
1
w
2
; w
2
w
3
; w
1
w
4
; w
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
P (w
1
) = f
3
f
4
; f
2
f
3
; f
2
f
4
; f
1
f
4
; f
1
f
3
; f
1
f
2
; f
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
P (w
2
) = f
3
f
4
; f
2
f
3
; f
1
f
4
; f
2
f
4
; f
1
f
3
; f
1
f
2
; f
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
P (w
3
) = f
1
f
2
; f
2
f
3
; f
1
f
3
; f
2
f
4
; f
1
f
4
; f
3
f
4
; f
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
P (w
4
) = f
1
f
2
; f
1
f
3
; f
1
f
4
; f
2
f
3
; f
2
f
4
; f
3
f
4
; f
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
.
Stage 1: By the deferred-acceptance algorithm we obtain the two optimal-
stable matchings
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

F
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4

W
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
:
Set T
0
(P ) = P and S
0
(P ) = f
F
g. The set T (T
0
(P )) of Step 1 consists of
the following truncations of P :
T
 
T
0
(P )

=

P
(f
1
;w
1
)
; P
(f
1
;w
2
)
; P
(f
2
;w
1
)
; P
(f
2
;w
2
)
; P
(f
3
;w
3
)
; P
(f
3
;w
4
)
; P
(f
4
;w
3
)
; P
(f
4
;w
4
)
	
where in all proles rms and workers have the same preference as in P;
except
P
(f
1
;w
1
)
(f
1
) = w
2
w
4
; w
3
w
4
; w
2
w
3
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
P
(f
1
;w
2
)
(f
1
) = w
1
w
3
; w
3
w
4
; w
1
w
4
; w
1
; w
3
; w
4
P
(f
2
;w
1
)
(f
2
) = w
2
w
3
; w
3
w
4
; w
2
w
4
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
P
(f
2
;w
2
)
(f
2
) = w
1
w
4
; w
3
w
4
; w
1
w
3
; w
1
; w
3
; w
4
P
(f
3
;w
3
)
(f
3
) = w
1
w
4
; w
1
w
2
; w
2
w
4
; w
1
; w
2
; w
4
P
(f
3
;w
4
)
(f
3
) = w
2
w
3
; w
1
w
2
; w
1
w
3
; w
1
; w
2
; w
3
P
(f
4
;w
3
)
(f
4
) = w
2
w
4
; w
1
w
2
; w
1
w
4
; w
1
; w
2
; w
4
P
(f
4
;w
4
)
(f
4
) = w
1
w
3
; w
1
w
2
; w
2
w
3
; w
1
; w
2
; w
3
.
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In Step 2, and since the set T (T
0
(P )) is non-empty, we obtain for each of
its truncations the corresponding rm-optimal stable matching
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

(f
1
;w
1
)
F
w
2
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
3

(f
1
;w
2
)
F
w
1
w
3
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
2
w
4

(f
2
;w
1
)
F
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2

(f
2
;w
2
)
F
w
2
w
4
w
1
w
4
w
2
w
3
w
1
w
3

(f
3
;w
3
)
F
w
2
w
4
w
2
w
3
w
1
w
4
w
1
w
3

(f
3
;w
4
)
F
w
1
w
3
w
1
w
4
w
2
w
3
w
2
w
4

(f
4
;w
3
)
F
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
4
w
2
w
3
w
1
w
2

(f
4
;w
4
)
F
w
2
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
3
:
Notice that 
(f
1
;w
1
)
F
= 
(f
4
;w
4
)
F
. In Step 3 we obtain the set T

(T
0
(P )) =

P
(f
1
;w
1
)
; P
(f
4
;w
3
)
; P
(f
4
;w
4
)
	
. For instance, the truncation P
(f
1
;w
2
)
does not
belong to this set because
Ch


F
(w
2
) [ 
(f
1
;w
2
)
F
(w
2
) ; P (w
2
)

= Ch (ff
1
; f
2
g [ ff
2
; f
4
g ; P (w
2
))
= Ch (ff
1
; f
2
; f
4
g ; P (w
2
))
= ff
1
; f
4
g
6= ff
2
; f
4
g
= 
(f
1
;w
2
)
F
(w
2
),
but this is not a problem since 
(f
1
;w
2
)
F
is not stable because the pair (w
2
; f
1
)
blocks it. Considering the ordering P
(f
1
;w
1
)

1
P
(f
4
;w
3
)

1
P
(f
4
;w
4
)
we have
that
b
T (T
0
(P )) =

P
(f
4
;w
4
)
	
since P
(f
1
;w
1
)
does not belong to it because w
4
=2

(f
1
;w
1
)
F
(f
4
) and P
(f
1
;w
1
)

1
P
(f
4
;w
4
)
and P
(f
4
;w
3
)
does not belong to it either
because w
4
=2 
(f
4
;w
3
)
F
(f
4
) and P
(f
4
;w
3
)

1
P
(f
4
;w
4
)
. Set T
1
(P ) =

P
(f
4
;w
4
)
	
and S
1
(P ) = f
F
; 
1
g where 
1
= 
(f
1
;w
1
)
F
= 
(f
4
;w
4
)
F
. This nishes Stage 1.
Stage 2: In Step 1, we obtain for the truncation P
(f
4
;w
4
)
(the unique one
belonging to the set T
1
(P )) the corresponding set of truncations using 
(f
4
;w
4
)
F
and 
W
:
T
 
T
1
(P )

=

P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
1
;w
2
)
; P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
2
;w
1
)
; P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
2
;w
2
)
;
P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
3
;w
3
)
; P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
3
;w
4
)
; P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)

:
Now, in Step 2 and since T (T
1
(P )) 6= ;, for each truncation in T (T
1
(P ))
11
we compute its corresponding rms{optimal stable matching
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

(f
4
;w
4
)(f
1
;w
2
)
F
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2

(f
4
;w
4
)(f
2
;w
1
)
F
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2

(f
4
;w
4
)(f
2
;w
2
)
F
w
2
w
4
w
1
w
4
w
2
w
3
w
1
w
3

(f
4
;w
4
)(f
3
;w
3
)
F
w
2
w
4
w
2
w
3
w
1
w
4
w
1
w
3

(f
4
;w
4
)(f
3
;w
4
)
F
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
4
w
2
w
3
w
1
w
2

(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)
F
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
4
w
2
w
3
w
1
w
2
:
In Step 3 we obtain the set
T

 
T
1
(P )

=

P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
3
;w
4
)
; P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)
	
and consider the ordering P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
3
;w
4
)

2
P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)
. In Step 4 the set
b
T (T
1
(P )) is the singleton

P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)
	
since w
3
=2 
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
3
;w
4
)
F
(f
4
). Set
T
2
(P ) =

P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)
	
and S
2
(P ) = f
F
; 
1
; 
2
g where 
2
= 
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)
F
.
Stage 3: In Step 1, we obtain for the truncation P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)
its corre-
sponding truncations using 
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)
F
and 
W
:
T
 
T
2
(P )

=

P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
2
;w
1
)
; P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
3
;w
3
)
	
:
Since it is non-empty we compute, in Step 2, the corresponding rm-optimal
stable matchings
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
2
;w
1
)
F
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2

(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
3
;w
3
)
F
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
:
In Step 3 we obtain the set
T

 
T
2
(P )

=

P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
3
;w
3
)
	
:
Notice that P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
2
;w
1
)
does not belong to it because
Ch


(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
2
;w
1
)
F
(w
3
) [ 
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)
F
(w
3
) ; P (w
3
)

= ff
1
; f
2
g
6= ff
2
; f
3
g
= 
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
2
;w
1
)
F
(w
3
).
Since T

(T
2
(P )) is a singleton we set T
3
(P ) =
b
T (T
2
(P )) =

P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
3
;w
3
)
	
and S
3
(P ) = f
F
; 
1
; 
2
; 
W
g because 
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
3
;w
3
)
F
= 
W
.
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Stage 4: Finally, the algorithm stops (that is, K = 4) because T (T
3
(P )) =
;. Therefore S(P ) = f
F
; 
1
; 
2
; 
W
g, where
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

F
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4

1
w
2
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
3

2
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
4
w
2
w
3
w
1
w
2

W
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
.
3.3 Comments
Before moving to the next section to prove the Theorem few comments about
the algorithm are in order.
First, for all truncations the worker-optimal stable matching coincides
with the worker-optimal stable matching of the original preference prole P ;
that is, 
W
= 
(
f
1
1
;
w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
W
for all P
(
f
1
1
;
w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
.
Second, to make sure that the rm-optimal stable matching correspond-
ing to a truncation is indeed stable it is suÆcient to check only that Property
4 of Remark 1 holds; that is, all workers would choose it if confronted with
the union of itself and the rm-optimal stable matching of the original pro-
le. This is what Step 3 does in each stage. At the light of Example 1 this is
surprising, although Lemma 2 in Section 4 states that this is the case. How-
ever, the fact that a truncation only changes one rm's preference guarantees
that the other three properties also hold.
Third, the algorithm would also work without Step 4. However, it helps
very much to speed up the algorithm (see Corollary 1 in Section 4) because,
by adding it, we avoid carrying to subsequent stages all truncations (and all
others obtained from them) whose corresponding rm-optimal stable match-
ing will be identied later on.
Fourth, the particular ordering on the set T

 
T
k
(P )

is irrelevant but
necessary. Namely, it is necessary because we can not ask for individual ra-
tionality of each truncation against all other truncations. To see this consider
in Stage 1 of Example 2, the set T

(T
0
(P )) =

P
(f
1
;w
1
)
; P
(f
4
;w
3
)
; P
(f
4
;w
4
)
	
.
If we had dened it without the restriction of the ordering, i.e.
b
T

 
T
0
(P )

=
n
P
(f;w)
2 T

 
T
0
(P )

j 8P
(f
0
;w
0
)
2 T

 
T
0
(P )

; w
0
2 
(f;w)
F
(f
0
)
o
this set would have been empty since P
(f
1
;w
1
)
=2
b
T

(T
0
(P )) because w
4
=2

(f
1
;w
1
)
F
(f
4
), P
(f
4
;w
3
)
=2
b
T

(T
0
(P )) because w
4
=2 
(f
4
;w
3
)
F
(f
4
), and (in contrast
with the correct denition of
b
T (T
0
(P ))) P
(f
4
;w
4
)
=2
b
T

(T
0
(P )) because w
1
=2

(f
4
;w
4
)
F
(f
1
). Moreover, it is irrelevant because the outcome of the algorithm
13
does not depend on the specic ordering on the set T

(T
k
(P )). For instance,
in Stage 1 of Example 2 we could have used (instead of 
1
) the ordering
P
(f
4
;w
4
)

1
0
P
(f
4
;w
3
)

1
0
P
(f
1
;w
1
)
without altering the nal outcome of the
algorithm.
4 The Proof of the Theorem
Let P be a substitutable preference prole and let 
F
and 
W
be its corre-
sponding optimal-stable matchings. Given an (f; w) truncation of P where
w 2 
F
(f) n
W
(f), denote by S
(f;w)
(P ) the set of stable matchings relative
to the truncated prole P
(f;w)
that satisfy the Choice Property; namely,
S
(f;w)
(P ) =

 2 S
 
P
(f;w)

j 8w
0
; Ch (
F
(w
0
) [ (w
0
); P (w
0
)) = (w
0
)
	
:
(1)
Lemma 2 below says that S
(f;w)
(P ) is a subset of S (P ) : Hence, the Choice
Property is suÆcient to guarantee stability of a matching which is stable
relative to a truncation.
Lemma 2. Let  be a matching such that  2 S
(f;w)
(P ): Then  2 S(P ):
Proof. Assume that  =2 S(P ). If  is not individually rational for preference
prole P then it is not individually rational for preference prole P
(f;w)
and
hence  =2 S
f;w
(P ). Therefore, let ( ew;
e
f) be a blocking pair of ; namely,
e
f =2  (ew) ; (2)
ew 2 Ch((
e
f) [ fewg; P (
e
f)); and (3)
e
f 2 Ch(( ew) [ f
e
fg; P (ew)): (4)
Consider the following two cases:
1.
e
f 6= f: In this case P
(f;w)

e
f

= P

e
f

and P
(f;w)
(ew) = P (ew) imply-
ing that the pair ( ew;
e
f) also blocks the matching  in the preference
prole P
(f;w)
. Therefore  =2 S
 
P
(f;w)

. Hence  =2 S
(f;w)
(P ).
2.
e
f = f: Then by conditions (3) and (4)
ew 2 Ch((f) [ fewg; P (f)) and (5)
f 2 Ch(( ew) [ ffg; P (ew)): (6)
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Assume that  2 S
 
P
(f;w)

, otherwise  =2 S
f;w
(P ) and the Lemma is
proved. Therefore,
ew =2 Ch((f) [ fewg; P
(f;w)
(f)). (7)
The denition of P
(f;w)
(f) and conditions (5) and (7) imply
w 2 (f) [ fewg.
But, by the denition of P
(f;w)
(f) again, w =2 (f): Then ew = w. Now,
we can rewrite conditions (3) and (4) as
w 2 Ch((f) [ fwg; P (f)) and
f 2 Ch((w) [ ffg; P (w)): (8)
Notice that by hypothesis f 2 
F
(w) and by condition (2) f =2 (w).
Also, by hypothesis,  2 S
(f;w)
(P ) which means that, in particular,
Ch (
F
(w) [  (w) ; P (w)) =  (w)
holds. But this contradicts (8) because
Ch ( (w) [ ffg ; P (w))P (w) (w) = Ch (
F
(w) [  (w) ; P (w)) :
Next Lemma establishes two useful properties of the choice set.
Lemma 3. For all subsets of partners A;B; and C of agent a 2 F [W :
(a) Ch (A [B;P (a)) = Ch (Ch (A) [B;P (a)).
(b) Ch (A [B;P (a)) = A and Ch (B [ C; P (a)) = B imply Ch (A [ C; P (a)) =
A.
Proof. Property (a) follows from Proposition 2.3 in Blair (1988). To prove
(b), consider the following equalities:
Ch (A [ C; P (a)) = Ch (Ch (A [ B;P (a)) [ C; P (a)) by hypothesis
= Ch (A [B [ C; P (a)) by (a)
= Ch (A [ Ch (B [ C; P (a)) ; P (a)) by (a)
= Ch (A [B;P (a)) by hypothesis
= A by hypothesis.
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Lemma 4 below can be understood as an strengthening of Lemma 2.
It says that to check the Choice Property only for the rm-optimal stable
matching it is suÆcient to guarantee that all stable matchings relative to the
truncated prole are indeed stable for the original prole.
Lemma 4. Let P
(f;w)
be a truncation such that
Ch


F
(w
0
) [ 
(f;w)
F
(w
0
); P (w
0
)

= 
(f;w)
F
(w
0
)
holds for all w
0
. Then,  2 S(P
(f;w)
) implies  2 S(P ):
Proof. Let  be a matching such that  2 S(P
(f;w)
): Then by Property 4 in
Remark 1, for all w
0
;
Ch

(w
0
) [ 
(f;w)
F
(w
0
); P
(f;w)
(w
0
)

= (w
0
):
However, for all w
0
; preferences P
(f;w)
(w
0
) and P (w
0
) coincide. Therefore,
Ch

(w
0
) [ 
(f;w)
F
(w
0
); P (w
0
)

= (w
0
) (9)
also holds. By hypothesis, for all w
0
Ch


F
(w
0
) [ 
(f;w)
F
(w
0
); P (w
0
)

= 
(f;w)
F
(w
0
): (10)
By Lemma 3 we have that conditions (9) and (10) imply that for all w
0
Ch (
F
(w
0
) [ (w
0
); P (w
0
)) = (w
0
):
Then, by Lemma 2,  2 S
(f;w)
(P ). Hence,  2 S(P ):
Lemma 5 says that only adding the individual rationality condition of a
stable matching relative to a truncation ensures that the matching is stable
relative to the truncated prole. This will immediately imply Corollary 1
which will be crucial to the justication of Step 4 in the algorithm.
Lemma 5. Let  be a matching such that  2 S(P ) \ IR
 
P
(f;w)

: Then
 2 S(P
(f;w)
):
Proof. Assume that  =2 S(P
(f;w)
) and  2 IR
 
P
(f;w)

. Then, there exists a
blocking pair ( ew;
e
f) of ; namely,
ew 2 Ch((
e
f) [ fewg; P
(f;w)
(
e
f)) and (11)
e
f 2 Ch((ew) [ f
e
fg; P
(f;w)
(ew)). (12)
Consider the following two cases:
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1.
e
f 6= f: Because P
(f;w)
(ew) = P (ew) and P
(f;w)

e
f

= P

e
f

the pair
( ew;
e
f) also blocks the matching  in the preference prole P . Hence,
 =2 S (P ).
2.
e
f = f: Then by conditions (11) and (12)
ew 2 Ch((f) [ f ewg; P
(f;w)
(f)) and (13)
f 2 Ch(( ew) [ ffg; P (ew)):
The hypothesis that  2 IR
 
P
(f;w)

implies that w =2  (f). Therefore,
condition (13) can be rewritten as ew 2 Ch((f)[fewg; P (f)), implying
that the pair ( ew; f) blocks  in the preference P . Hence  =2 S (P ).
As we have just said, Corollary 1 below justies the insertion of Step 4
at each stage of the algorithm. If we have two truncations P
(f;w)
and P
(f
0
;w
0
)
with the properties that (1) their corresponding rm-optimal stable match-
ings 
(f;w)
F
and 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
satisfy the Choice Property (that is, they are stable
relative to the original prole) and (2) the matching 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
is individually
rational relative to P
(f;w)
(that is, w =2 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
(f)) then we may not add at
this stage 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
(with the subsequent computational savings) because we
will nd it later on (and add it to the provisional set of stable matchings) as
a rm-optimal stable matching of a subsequent truncation of P
(f;w)
.
Corollary 1. Let P
(f;w)
; P
(f
0
;w
0
)
be two truncations such that 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
2 S (P ).
If w =2 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
(f) then 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
2 S
 
P
(f;w)

:
Proof. Notice that w =2 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
(f) implies that 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
2 IR
 
P
(f;w)

: Hence,
by Lemma 5, 
(f
0
;w
0
)
F
2 S(P
(f;w)
):
Next lemma establishes a useful fact about the set of stable matchings: a
worker who is matched to the same rm in the two optimal-stable matchings
has also to be matched to the same rm in all stable matchings.
Lemma 6. Assume w 2 
F
(f)\
W
(f). Then, w 2  (f) for all  2 S (P ) :
Proof. Assume otherwise; that is, we can nd w, f , and  2 S (P ) such that
w 2 
F
(f) \ 
W
(f) and w =2  (f). By Remark 1,
Ch (
F
(f) [  (f) ; P (f)) = 
F
(f) (14)
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and
Ch (
W
(f) [  (f) ; P (f)) =  (f) : (15)
Since w 2 
F
(f) condition (14) implies that w 2 Ch (
F
(f) \  (f) ; P (f)).
Lemma 7 and its Corollary 2 guarantee that any non-optimal stable
matching  will eventually be identied and selected as the rm-optimal
stable matching corresponding to a preference prole which will be obtained
after truncating the preferences of a sequence of rms.
Lemma 7. Let  2 S(P ) be such that 
F
6=  6= 
W
: Then there exists
P
(f;w)
such that  2 S(P
(f;w)
):
Proof. Since 
F
6=  then there exists w and f such that w 2 
F
(f)n(f).
Therefore, by Lemma 6, w =2 
W
(f). Consider the preference prole P
(f;w)
and notice that 
(f;w)
W
= 
W
: Because w =2 (f) we have that  2 IR
 
P
(f;w)

:
Hence, Lemma 5 implies that  2 S
 
P
(f;w)

:
Remark 2 As a consequence of Lemma 7 and the fact that 
F
=2 S(P
(f;w)
)
we have that #S(P ) > #S(P
(f;w)
) whenever w 2 
F
(f) n
W
(f) :
Corollary 2. Let  2 S(P ) be such that 
F
6=  6= 
W
: Then there exists
a sequence of pairs (f
i
1
; w
j
1
) ::: (f
i
k
; w
j
k
) such that  = 
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
F
2
S(P
(
f
i
1
;w
j
1
)
:::
(
f
i
k
;w
j
k
)
):
Proof. Let  2 S(P ) be such that 
F
6=  6= 
W
. By Lemma 5 there exists
P
(f;w)
such that  2 S(P
(f;w)
): If  = 
(f;w)
F
the statement follows. Otherwise,
since 
W
= 
(f;w)
W
; we apply again Lemma 5 replacing the roles of P and 
F
by P
(f;w)
and 
(f;w)
F
; respectively.
Now, we are ready to show that the outcome of the algorithm is the set
of stable matchings.
Proof of the Theorem. First, from Lemma 4, we have S
1
(P )  S (P ) :
Applying iteratively Lemma 4 to successive stages we obtain
S
K
(P )  S (P ) :
Second, assume that  2 S (P ) : By Corollary 2, there exists k  K such
that  2 S
k
(P ). Therefore,
S (P )  S
K
(P ) :
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5 Appendix
To illustrate the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which rms make oers
we use the preference prole P
(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
3
;w
3
)
of Example 2 to compute

(f
4
;w
4
)(f
4
;w
3
)(f
3
;w
3
)
F
; that is, F = ff
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
g and W = fw
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
g are
the two sets of agents with the following substitutable prole of preferences
P (f
1
) = w
1
w
2
; w
1
w
3
; w
2
w
4
; w
3
w
4
; w
1
w
4
; w
2
w
3
; w
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
P (f
2
) = w
1
w
2
; w
2
w
3
; w
1
w
4
; w
3
w
4
; w
1
w
3
; w
2
w
4
; w
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
P (f
3
) = w
1
w
4
; w
1
w
2
; w
2
w
4
; w
1
; w
2
; w
4
P (f
4
) = w
1
w
2
; w
1
w
4
; w
1
; w
2
P (w
1
) = f
3
f
4
; f
2
f
3
; f
2
f
4
; f
1
f
4
; f
1
f
3
; f
1
f
2
; f
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
P (w
2
) = f
3
f
4
; f
2
f
3
; f
1
f
4
; f
2
f
4
; f
1
f
3
; f
1
f
2
; f
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
P (w
3
) = f
1
f
2
; f
2
f
3
; f
1
f
3
; f
2
f
4
; f
1
f
4
; f
3
f
4
; f
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
P (w
4
) = f
1
f
2
; f
1
f
3
; f
1
f
4
; f
2
f
3
; f
2
f
4
; f
3
f
4
; f
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
.
The oers made by rms, and received and accepted by workers, in Step
1 are:
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4
f
1
f
2
f
4
; f
3
f
3
f
4
f
1
f
4
; f
3
:
The provisional matching 
1
after Step 1 is:
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

1
w
2
; w
1
w
4
w
1
w
2
:
The oers made by rms, and received and accepted by workers, in Step
2 are:
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4
w
2
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
f
3
f
4
f
1
f
4
f
2
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
3
f
4
f
1
f
4
f
2
f
1
f
2
:
The provisional matching 
2
after Step 2 is:
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

2
w
2
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
1
w
2
:
The oers made by rms, and received and accepted by workers, in Step
3 are:
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4
w
2
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
f
3
f
4
f
1
f
3
f
4
f
2
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4
f
3
f
4
f
2
f
1
f
2
:
19
The provisional matching 
3
after Step 3 is:
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

3
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
:
The oers made by rms, and received and accepted by workers, in Step
4 are:
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
4
f
3
f
4
f
3
f
4
f
1
f
2
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4
f
3
f
4
f
1
f
2
f
1
f
2
:
the provisional matching 
4
after Step 4 is:
f
1
f
2
f
3
f
4

4
w
3
w
4
w
3
w
4
w
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
:
The algorithm stops after Step 4 because all oers have been accepted. The
provisional matching 
4
, becomes denite, and it is the rm-optimal stable
matching.
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